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Introduction
Since the pioneering work of Gale and Shapley [15] , the (two-sided) stable matching model has been generalized in many different ways [17, 20, 21] . Among them is the stable allocation model (schedule matching) of AlkanGale [3] . This is a many-to-many matching model where each pair's partnership is represented by a nonnegative integer. A thorough study of this model was made by Alkan and Gale [3] in terms of choice functions. A value function approach for the stable allocation model was initiated by Eguchi, Fujishige and Tamura [8, 13] by utilizing concepts and results from discrete convex analysis (Fujishige [11] , Murota [23, 24] ). Specifically, discrete concavity called M ♮ -concavity plays the primary role as the property of value functions.
The objective of this paper is to establish a substantial connection from the value function approach to the choice function approach, with particular interest in the following questions about the M ♮ -concave value function model:
• Whether stable allocations exist or not?
• Whether stable allocations form a lattice or not?
• Whether stable allocations form a distributive lattice or not?
Stable matching model In the college admissions problem considered by Gale-Shapley [15] , each student (college) has a strict preference ordering on colleges (students). Additionally, each college has a quota, the maximum number of students it can admit. This is the stable matching problem in its original form.
Blair [6] generalized this model to a great extent. In his model, agents on each side can have multiple partners and preferences are given by pathindependent choice functions. A choice function represents a preference on combinations of agents, not on individuals. He showed that the set of (pairwise) stable matchings is nonempty and forms a lattice. However, the lattice operations are not simple and the lattice is not necessarily distributive.
Fleiner [10] pointed out that the nonemptiness and the lattice structure of Blair's model can be shown by using Tarski's fixed point theorem [31] . The fundamental observation in this approach is that stable matchings correspond to fixed points of a certain monotone function and the deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale-Shapley can be regarded as an iteration of this function. Moreover, Fleiner found that if the choice functions are "w-increasing" (beyond being path-independent), the lattice operations for stable matchings become simpler and the lattice of stable matchings is distributive.
define choice functions from value functions. Then the value function model can be transformed to a choice function model. If there are no ties in the maximum of the value function, the maximizer is uniquely determined and the choice function returns a single vector as the possible choice. If this is the case, we say that the value function is unique-selecting.
In this paper, we show that if the value functions are unique-selecting and M ♮ -concave, the choice functions induced from them have consistency, persistence and size-monotonicity, which are the properties highlighted in Alkan-Gale [3] (Lemmas 3.8 and 4.9). A combination of these facts with the results of [3] shows that the stable allocations for M ♮ -concave value functions form a distributive lattice with several significant properties such as polarity, complementarity, and uni-size property (Theorems 4.11 and 4.12).
Furthermore, we point out that these results can be extended for quasi M ♮ -concave value functions (Theorems 5.6 and 5.7). Quasi M-concavity is defined by ordinal relationship of function values, and not by values themselves. Therefore, the extensibility to quasi M-concave functions means that the desirable structure of stable allocations is guaranteed solely by the concave-like ordering of values. This agrees with the fact that the stability of allocations is defined not by function values themselves but by their ordinal relationship.
M ♮ -concave Functions
In this section we introduce the concept of M ♮ -concave functions, which plays a central role in discrete convex analysis (see Murota [23] for details).
Definition
Let S be a nonempty finite set, and Z and R be the sets of integers and reals, respectively. We define the positive support and the negative support of x = (x(e) | e ∈ S) ∈ Z S , respectively, by
For any x, y ∈ Z S , the vectors x ∧ y and x ∨ y in Z S are defined by (x ∧ y)(e) = min{x(e), y(e)}, (x ∨ y)(e) = max{x(e), y(e)} (e ∈ S).
For each e ∈ S, we define χ e as the vector whose e-component is 1 and other components are 0. For a function f :
where χ 0 is a zero vector.
M ♮ -concavity for a set function f is also defined by (M ♮ ), where f :
Here χ X is the characteristic vector of X, i.e., χ X (e) = 1 if e ∈ X and χ X (e) = 0 otherwise. The condition (M ♮ ) is originated from the exchange axiom in matroid theory. Despite its seemingly complicated definition, M ♮ -concave functions include many functions familiar to us; see Appendix A.
M
♮ -concave functions are defined by Murota-Shioura [25] as a variant of M-convex functions introduced by Murota [22] .
Properties
M ♮ -concave functions have nice features from the point of view of mathematical economics.
A value function (or utility function) is usually assumed to be concave in economics. For any M ♮ -concave function f : Z S → R ∪ {−∞}, there exists a concave functionf : R S → R ∪ {−∞} withf (x) = f (x) for any x ∈ Z S . That is, an M ♮ -concave function on Z S has a concave extension on R S .
Also a value function is usually assumed to have decreasing marginal returns, which is equivalent to submodularity in the discrete case. An M ♮ -concave function f :
Kelso-Crawford [19] introduced gross substitutes condition for a set function U : 2 S → R ∪ {−∞}:
(GS) For any p, q ∈ R S with p ≤ q and any X ∈ 2 S which maximizes the value of
. This property (GS) is widely accepted as an important property of value function in demand theory. If we interpret X ∈ 2 S as a set of commodities, U (X) as a monetary valuation for X, and p ∈ R S as prices, then the above condition says: when each price increases or remains the same, the consumer still wants commodities which are chosen before and whose prices remain the same.
A gross substitute function U is M ♮ -concave. The converse is also true. That is, a function f with domf ⊆ {0, 1} S is M ♮ -concave if and only if the associated U is gross substitute [14, 16, 28] . Furthermore, it is known [7, 27] that M ♮ -concavity for functions on Z S can be characterized by generalized versions of (GS) under certain natural assumptions.
Stable Allocation Model
We now consider two finite sets of agents I and J. We interpret I as workers and J as firms. Each worker i ∈ I can work at multiple firms, and each firm j ∈ J can employ multiple workers. Each firm employs each worker with multi-units of labor time . An allocation is an I × J matrix of nonnegative integers. The (i, j)-entry represents the number of units of labor time for which i ∈ I works for j ∈ J. In the stable allocation model, each agent has a preference on his labor allocation and the main theme is the stability of allocation that we define later.
Let E = I × J, which is the set of all pairs of workers i ∈ I and firms j ∈ J. Then an allocation X is an element of Z E + , i.e., an
We denote the i-th row of X by x i , i.e.,
and the j-th column of X by x j , i.e.,
Each agent k ∈ I ∪ J has a preference on allocations. We assume that k's preference for X ∈ Z E + depends only on x k . To represent agents' preferences mathematically, several ways can be conceived. In Sections 3.1 and 3.2, we introduce two different submodels: value function model and choice function model. The difference between the two is how to represent agents' preferences. In Section 3.3, we explain the relation between these two submodels.
Value function model
We describe the value function model of Eguchi-Fujishige-Tamura [8] and Fujishige-Tamura [13] . In this model, each agent k ∈ I ∪ J has a value function f k : Z E k + → R ∪ {−∞} to evaluate the desirability of allocations for k. We assume that for each k ∈ I ∪ J, domf k is bounded and has 0 ∈ Z E k + as the minimum point.
Let
, the upper bound of domf k , for all k ∈ I ∪ J. We define the set of maximizers of f k subject to a capacity
Then the (pairwise) stability notion is formalized as follows 2 : Definition 3.1. (Stability in terms of value functions) An allocation X ∈ Z E + is stable with respect to {f k } k∈I∪J if it satisfies the following two conditions:
2. There is no blocking pair, where a blocking pair for X is a pair (i, j) ∈ E such that for some y i ∈ domf i , y j ∈ domf j , the following hold:
Here it should be clear that
If the condition 1 fails, some agent k ∈ I ∪ J prefers to decrease his labor time, and he tries to deviate from the allocation.
The inequality y i ≤ (x i ∨ u i (j)χ j ) in the condition 2 means that y i 's jcomponent is virtually unbounded while the other components are bounded by x i . The inequality y j ≤ (x j ∨u j (i)χ i ) can be interpreted similarly. Then if the condition 2 fails under the condition 1, there exists some pair (i, j) such that both i and j prefer to increase the labor time between them and their demands coincide, and they try to increase the allocation on (i, j) together.
It is known 3 that when {f k } k∈I∪J are all M ♮ -concave functions, the last equation in the above definition can be removed without changing the meaning of stability. Therefore under the assumption of M ♮ -concavity, the above definition can be rewritten in the following form:
+ is stable with respect to {f k } k∈I∪J if and only if it satisfies the following two conditions:
Choice function model
Let b ∈ Z S + be an upper bound vector and
In this subsection, we explain the choice function model. Let each agent
Then the (pairwise) stability notion due to [3] is formalized as follows:
(Stability in terms of choice functions) An allocation X ∈ Z E + is stable with respect to {C k } k∈I∪J if it satisfies the following two conditions:
Here we say that
In Alkan-Gale [3] , choice functions are assumed to possess two natural properties below.
Consistency is quite a reasonable property since C(x) means the most desirable allocation among
Persistence is a generalization of the substitutability that has widely been used in ordinary matching models since Roth [29] . The condition of persistence is equivalent to the following: for each y ∈ B and e ∈ S,
This says that if an agent wants an item e strictly less than the capacity y(e), he does not increase his demand on e when the capacity is enlarged to x.
When {C k } k∈I∪J are all consistent and persistent, the definition of stability in Definition 3.3 can be rewritten in the following form: Lemma 3.6. Assume that choice functions {C k } k∈I∪J are all consistent and persistent. An allocation X ∈ Z E + is stable with respect to {C k } k∈I∪J if and only if it satisfies the following two conditions:
Remark 3.7. For a choice function C : 2 S → 2 S , it is known that pathindependence condition
is equivalent to the combination of consistence and persistence (substitutability) [1] . Hence for a choice function C : B → B, consistence and persistence in conjunction can be regarded as a vector version of pathindependence.
From value function model to choice function model
Let us say that a value function f :
We say that C is induced from f . The following lemma asserts that M ♮ -concavity of value function f implies persistence. Proof. Consistency of C is obvious by the definition (3.1) of induction. Persistence can be proved by using Lemma 5.2 of [12] , which is valid for a general M ♮ -concave function. For a unique-selecting M ♮ -concave function, however, the following simpler proof is possible.
To prove by contradiction, suppose that there exist x, y ∈ Z S + such that x ≥ y holds and
. Then e ∈ supp + (x ′ − y ′ ), so we can apply the exchange axiom (M ♮ ) to x ′ , y ′ and e. Then for some e ′ ∈ supp − (x ′ − y ′ ) ∪ {0} the following inequality holds:
In (3.2), we have two cases:
, and therefore x ′ − χ e + χ e ′ ≤ x, which is also true in the other case of e ′ = 0. Since
(e). These two strict inequalities contradict (3.2).
By Lemmas 3.2, 3.6, and 3.8 we obtain the following fact. Theorem 3.9. Assume that {f k } k∈I∪J are all unique-selecting M ♮ -concave functions, and let C k be the choice function induced from f k for each k ∈ I ∪ J. Then X ∈ Z E + is stable with respect to {f k } k∈I∪J if and only if it is stable with respect to {C k } k∈I∪J .
Note that when {C k } k∈I∪J and {B k } k∈I∪J are defined from {f k } as above, the vector u k ∈ Z E k + in the value function model serves as the vector 
Strong Lattice Structure of Stable Allocations

Choice function model
Alkan-Gale [3] showed that if choice functions are consistent and persistent, there always exists a stable allocation. Moreover, the set of all stable allocations forms a lattice. To state this more precisely, we introduce orderings on allocations. For allocations X and Y , we write C I (X ∨ Y ) for the allocation whose ith row is C i (x i ∨ y i ) for all i ∈ I. Symmetrically we write C J (X ∨ Y ) for the allocation whose jth column is C j (x j ∨ y j ) for all j ∈ J. Then we can define an ordering ⪰ I on allocations by
Then the following theorems hold. 
The following fact is easily implied by known facts in the literature [2, 3, 10, 18] . Proof. For completeness we provide a proof in Appendix B.
According to the above theorem, any two stable allocations X and Y surely have a join (least upper bound) and a meet (greatest lower bound) with respect to the ordering ⪰ I , which we denote by X ∨ I Y and X ∧ I Y , respectively. However, ∨ I and ∧ I do not admit simple representations (see Appendix B). It is also noted that the operations ∨ I and ∧ I are not necessarily distributive.
Alkan-Gale identified a crucial property of choice functions that implies many nice properties of the lattice of stable allocations. We use notation |x| = ∑ e∈S x(e) for x ∈ Z S + . 
The condition 2 above is equivalent to the following:
Theorems 4.5 and 4.6 say that size-monotonicity guarantees a rich structure of the set of stable allocations.
Note that size-monotonicity is a natural extension of "cardinal monotonicity" of Alkan [2] or "increasing property" (for a uniform weight) of Fleiner [10] . Also it corresponds to "law of aggregate demand" of HatfieldMilgrom [18] .
Value function model
Next we turn to M ♮ -concave value functions. Our main concern is the implications of M ♮ -concavity in the lattice structure of the set of stable allocations. Specifically, we show that the choice function induced from an M ♮ -concave value function satisfies size-monotonicity, which leads to the rich structure of stable allocations by Theorems 4.5 and 4.6.
First of all, a stable allocation surely exists if each agent's value function is M ♮ -concave. When {f k } k∈I∪J are all unique-selecting, a straightforward combination shows the existence of a stable allocation. In the general case with some f k not being unique-selecting, we can obtain the result through appropriate perturbations of f k .
Next we discuss the structure of the set of stable allocations. Here, we show that M ♮ -concavity implies size-monotonicity which guarantees the strong lattice structure of stable allocations. This implies, by Theorems 4.5 and 4.6, that M ♮ -concavity yields the rich structure of stable allocations, which is stated in Theorems 4.11 and 4.12 as the main results of this paper. 
By the definition off , the above inequality can be rephrased as follows:
On the other hand, as x ′ (e) < y ′ (e) ≤ y(e) ≤ x(e), we have
These two strict inequalities contradict (4.2). 
Here we define X ∨ I Y as the allocation whose ith row is equal to arg max { f i (z) | z ≤ (x i ∨ y i ) } for all i ∈ I, and X ∧ I Y as the allocation whose jth column is equal to arg max { f j (z) | z ≤ (x j ∨ y j ) } for all j ∈ J. It is noted that these definitions of ∨ I and ∧ I are consistent with those given in Section 4.1 in the choice function model. Indeed, Theorem 4.5 shows
Combining Lemmas 3.8 and 4.9, and Theorems 3.9, 4.5 and 4.6, we obtain the following theorems. 5 A functionf that satisfies the condition (M) is said to be M-concave.
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Theorem 4.11. If f k is a unique-selecting M ♮ -concave value function for each k ∈ I ∪ J, then the set of all stable allocations forms a distributive lattice with operations ∨ I and ∧ I .
Theorem 4.12.
If f k is a unique-selecting M ♮ -concave value function for each k ∈ I ∪ J, then for any stable allocations X and Y , the following hold:
These theorems establish an intimate connection of the M ♮ -concave value function model to the choice function model with size-monotonicity. Remark 4.13. Fleiner [10] pointed out that the nonemptiness and the lattice structure of many-to-many matching model (with {0,1}-variables) can be shown by using Tarski's fixed point theorem. The fundamental observation in this approach is that "stable pairs" (which correspond to stable matchings) can be regarded as fixed points of a certain monotone function. In fact, this approach can be naturally extended to integer variables, i.e., Theorems 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 can be obtained also by fixed point approach.
Moreover, Fleiner found that if the choice functions are w-increasing, the lattice operations of stable matchings become distributive and simply representable. Theorem 4.5 is an integer version of this result with w = 1. Remark 4.14. Hatfield-Milgrom [18] studied one-to-many matching model in terms of contracts between doctors and hospitals. They showed that if hospitals preferences satisfy "law of aggregate demand" (which corresponds to size-monotonicity) and other assumptions (which correspond to consistency and persistence), the strategy proofness holds for the deferred acceptance algorithm with doctors proposing. Hence it is expected that size-monotonicity (beyond consistency and persistence) has significant implication for strategy proofness also in the stable allocation model.
Extension to Quasi-concave Model
In Sections 2 and 3, we have shown that M ♮ -concavity in value function model leads to the strong lattice structure of stable allocations. In this section, we show that this result can be extended for quasi M ♮ -concave model.
As described below, quasi M-concavity is defined by ordinal relationship of function values, and not by values themselves. Therefore, the extensibility to quasi M-concave functions means that the strong lattice structure of stable allocations is guaranteed solely by the concave-like ordering of values. This agrees with the fact that the stability of allocations is defined not by function values themselves but by their ordinal relationship.
Quasi M ♮ -concavity
In this paper we have adopted the exchange property (M ♮ ) as the definition of M ♮ -concave functions (Section 2), but the original definition [23, 25] The concept of quasi M-concave function is proposed by Murota-Shioura [26] by weakening the condition (M) to
Just as M ♮ -concavity is defined (originally) in terms of M-concavity of the associatedf , we define quasi M ♮ -concavity as follows.
Obviously, (M) implies (QM), and therefore, an M ♮ -concave function is quasi M ♮ -concave.
As an M ♮ -version of (QM), we consider:
Lemma 5.2. Letf and f be associated by (4.1). Then Proof. Take x, y ∈ domf , and put S + = supp + (x−y) and S − = supp − (x−y).
(QM) forf in (4.1) is translated to conditions on f as follows:
This implies (QM ♮ ).
In contrast to (5.1), the converse of (5.4) does not hold. To check (QM), let x = (−1, 0, 1), y = (−2, 2, 0), and e = e 0 ∈ supp + (x−y). Since supp − (x − y) = {e 1 }, we can take only e 1 as e ′ ∈ supp − (x − y), and thenf
Thus, (5.2) fails for all e ′ ∈ supp − (x − y). Hencef does not satisfy (QM).
Quasi M ♮ -concave value function model
The choice functions induced from quasi M ♮ -concave functions have the same nice properties as those induced from M ♮ -concave functions. The proofs for quasi versions are almost the same as those for the original versions (Lemmas 3.8 and 4.9).
Lemma 5.4. For unique-selecting quasi M ♮ -concave value function f , the choice function C induced from f is consistent and persistent.
Proof. Consistency is obvious by the definition of induction. To prove persistence by contradiction, suppose that there exist x, y ∈ Z S + such that x ≥ y holds and
. Then e ∈ supp + (x ′ − y ′ ). By Lemma 5.2 we can apply the exchange axiom (QM ♮ ) to x ′ , y ′ and e. Then for some e ′ ∈ supp − (x ′ − y ′ ) ∪ {0} the following holds:
In (5.5), we have two cases:
, and therefore x ′ − χ e + χ e ′ ≤ x, which is also true in the other case of e ′ = 0. Since 
By the definition off , this can be rephrased as follows:
On the other hand, as x ′ (e) < y ′ (e) ≤ y(e) ≤ x(e), we have Theorem 5.7. If f k is a unique-selecting quasi M ♮ -concave value function for each k ∈ I ∪ J, then for any stable allocations X and Y , the following hold:
Remark 5.8. Suppose that f is a unique-selecting value function and satisfies (QM ♮ ). Then, the choice function C induced from f is consistent and persistent. However, C may not be size-monotone if f is not quasi M ♮ -concave (i.e., iff fails to satisfy (QM)). That is, (QM ♮ ) is sufficient for consistency and persistence, but not sufficient for size-monotonicity. 
A M ♮ -concave Functions: Examples and Operations
A.1 Examples of M ♮ -concave functions
We give some examples of M ♮ -concave functions [23, 24] . We denote variable x = (x(e) | e ∈ S) ∈ Z S and let f : Z S → R ∪ {−∞}. The inner product of w ∈ R S and x ∈ Z S is denoted as ⟨w, x⟩ = ∑ e∈S w(e) · x(e). Linear function: A linear (or affine) function
with w ∈ R S and α ∈ R is M ♮ -concave. Weighted matroid: Let I be the family of independent sets of a matroid on S and let w ∈ R S . The function defined as
Quadratic function: A quadratic function
Linear and separable concave functions with submodular restriction:
) and let w ∈ R S . The function defined as
x⟩ is replaced by a separable concave function ∑ e∈S φ e (x(e)) with φ e (e ∈ S) being univariate concave functions.
Maximum-value function:
Given a e ∈ R for all e ∈ S, we define a set function µ :
by choosing a * ∈ R ∪ {−∞} such that a * ≤ min { a e | e ∈ S }. Then µ is M ♮ -concave when identified with a function f : Z S → R ∪ {−∞} such that domf ⊆ {0, 1} S and f (χ X ) = µ(X) for X ∈ 2 S . This function corresponds to unit demand preference [16] .
is M ♮ -concave. This operation corresponds to aggregation of utility functions.
Remark A.1. There are other operations that preserve M ♮ -concavity not described above. It is to be noted, however, that a sum of M ♮ -concave functions is not necessarily M ♮ -concave.
B Proof of Theorem 4.3
The proof of Theorem 4.3 here is based heavily on several technical results of Alkan-Gale [3] . We first introduce some definitions and lemmas.
For an allocation X, we write σ I (X) for the allocation whose ith row is σ i (x i ) for all i ∈ I. Similarly, we write σ J (X) for the allocation whose jth column is σ j (x j ) for all j ∈ J. We say that a vector x ∈ B k is acceptable if C k (x) = x, and we write A k = { x ∈ B k | C k (x) = x }. We also say that an allocation X is I-acceptable if its ith row x i is acceptable for all i ∈ I, and J-acceptable if its jth column x j is acceptable for all j ∈ J.
For any k ∈ I ∪ J and x, y ∈ B k , we write x ⪰ k y if C k (x ∨ y) = x. Then X ⪰ I Y , which is already defined in Section 4.1, can be defined equivalently by the condition that x i ⪰ i y i for all i ∈ I.
The following lemmas are due to Alkan-Gale [3] . Recall that b k ∈ Z E k + is the vector such that
Lemma B.1. If C i (i ∈ I) is consistent and persistent, the following hold:
(1) [3, Lemma 7] x i ∈ A i is j-satiated if and only if σ i (x i )(j) = b i (j). Next we show V n ⪯ J V n+1 . From the recursion rule, we have V n ≤ B n+1 and V n ≤ U n , i.e., V n ≤ B n+1 ∧ U n , whereas B n+1 ∧ U n ≤ U n+1 by the persistence of C I and B n ≥ B n+1 . Hence we have V n ≤ U n+1 , from which follows C J (V n ) ⪯ J C J (U n+1 ) by (B.1). The right-hand side C J (U n+1 ) is equal to V n+1 by the recursion rule, and the left-hand side is equal to V n , since V n = C J (U n ) = C J (C J (U n )) = C J (V n ). Thus we have obtained V n ⪯ J V n+1 , completing the proof of (II).
Now we prove (i), (ii), and (iii).
(i) By the recursion rule, V n ≤ U n holds for any n ≥ 0. Since (B n ) converges, there is no (i, j) such that v(i, j) < u(i, j). Therefore U = V .
(ii) The latter half of (ii), X ⪰ I U and Y ⪰ I U follow directly from (I). The stability of U can be proved as follows. By the recursion rule and (i), we have C I ( B) = C I ( U ) = U and C J ( U ) = U . Hence the first condition of the stability: [ for every k ∈ I ∪ J, C k ( u k ) = u k ] holds. The second condition:
[ for every (i, j) ∈ I × J, u i is j-satiated or u j is i-satiated ] can be shown as follows. We consider following three cases, which exhaust all possibilities since b(i, j) ≤ b 0 (i, j) ≤ b i (j).
